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Block (2003) and Prinz (2006) have defended the idea that SSD perception remains in the substituting modality (auditory or tactile). Hurley and Noë (2003) instead argued that after substantial training with the device, the perceptual experience that the SSD user enjoys undergoes a change, switching from tactile/auditory to visual. This debate has unfolded in something like a stalemate where, I will argue, it has become difficult to determine whether the perception acquired through the coupling with an SSD remains in the substituting or the substituted modality. Within this puzzling deadlock two new approaches have been recently suggested. Ward and Meijer (2010) describe SSD perception as visual-like but characterize it as a kind of artificially induced synaesthesia. Auvray et al. (2007) and Auvray and Myin (2009) suggest that SSDs let their users experience a new kind of perception. Deroy and Auvray (forthcoming) refine this position, and argue that this new kind of perception depends on pre-existing senses without entirely aligning with any of them. So, they have talked about perceptual experience in SSDs as going “beyond vision”. In a similar vein, Fiona MacPherson (2011b) claims that “if the subjects (SSD users) have experiences with both vision-like and touch-like representational characteristics then perhaps they have a sense that ordinary humans do not” (MacPherson 2011b, p.139).
I use this suggestion of MacPherson’s as a motivation for exploring more fully the idea that SSD perception is something new. In this paper, in line with Auvray and Deroy, I therefore argue that SSD perception (at least in long-term, experienced users) doesn’t align with any of the pre-existing senses and that although it relies (quite heavily) on them, it nevertheless counts as something different and partially new. Unlike Auvray and Deroy however, I tentatively explain the new sensory sensitivity that these devices enable in terms of artificially induced synaesthesia. So the main goal of this paper is to synthesize and integrate the empirical work of Ward and Meijer (2010) within the conceptual framework developed by Deroy and Auvray (forthcoming), trying to cash out, in a more specific way, the details of their idea that SSD perception goes “beyond vision”. In suggesting the emergence of a new sensory modality in practised SSD users, I aim to make more explicit the false dilemma on which both Block/Prinz and Hurley/Noë rely; the shared assumption that there are only two options available to explain SSD perception (namely, that it either stays in the substituting modality, or is entirely visual). In endorsing an emergence thesis, which aims at taking us out of the dead-end of the visual vs not-visual (auditory/tactile) dilemma by refusing its two horns, I thus aim at breaking the deadlock in which the philosophical debate about sensory substitution has fallen. 
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Sensory Substitution: a brief introduction
The term ‘sensory substitution’ refers to the use of a sensory modality to supply environmental information normally gathered by another sense. Sensory substitution devices (SSDs) thus provide through one sensory modality (the substituting modality) access to features of the world that are generally experienced through another sensory modality (the substituted modality) (Auvray and Myin 2009). The expression ‘sensory substitution’ is therefore generally invoked to describe a form of technological intervention performed by an auxiliary system (via an appropriately structured interface) that aims at correlating tactile or auditory inputs to their distal causes. 
SSDs are generally divided into two main categories. These are visual-to-tactile substitution devices that convert images into tactile stimuli, and visual-to-auditory substitution systems that transform images into sounds. Under the umbrella of tactile substitution fall a large number of machineries, the most effective of which are the Brain Port (Kaczmarek and Bach-y-Rita 1995); and the AuxDeco Forehead Sensory Recognition System (FSRS) (Kamiyama et al. 2001). The class of visual-to-auditory substitution features also comprises several devices, including the vOICe (Meijer 1992); the PSVA (Capelle et al. 1998), and the Vibe (Hanneton et al. 2010). To give the reader concrete examples of the functioning of these systems, I focus next on two of these devices (the AuxDeco Forehead Retina System and the vOICe), and briefly discuss them to illustrate these two categories.

The AuxDeco Forehead Sensory Recognition System (FSRS) is an (electro) visual-to-tactile sensory substitution device that consists of three elements: 1) A high resolution digital camera; 2) a headband constituted of 512 electrodes; and 3) a central processing unit (CPU). The device works by encoding, through the video camera embedded on the headband, the surrounding environment into digital images. These images are sent to the CPU which converts them into data and transmits them to the headband’s flexible contact board, which recreates the outline of the objects mapped by the camera directly onto the user's forehead. Users of the device typically report having rich, dynamic 2D experiences that enable them to feel through their skin the shape of the objects they come across. 
The vOICe, in contrast, belongs to the category of visual-to-auditory substitution devices and was established by Peter Meijer in 1992. The device consists of three basic components: 1) a video camera embedded on a pair of sunglasses; 2) a Smartphone running a converting algorithm; 3) stereo earbuds. The vOICe relies on the converting algorithm pre-installed in the Smartphone to convert the gray-scales images captured by the camera into different sounds. These “soundscapes” vary as a function of the position and brightness of the pixels in the column of the image that is under the scan at each moment, and are then delivered to the visually impaired subject via a pair of simple earbuds. Although the conversion algorithm used by the vOICe is not immediately intuitive for inexperienced perceivers, several studies conducted on long-term (proficient) users of the device attest to the capacity of impaired individuals to locate unfamiliar objects in the world (Auvray et al. 2007), to discriminate their size and form (Amedi et al. 2007), and ultimately to use the apparatus as a tool for locomotor guidance and autonomous spatial navigation.
SSDs raise many interesting philosophical questions (see Chirimuuta and Paterson forthcoming; Humphrey 1992) but two will keep me busy in this paper. Question 1 (Q1) is: ‘what is SSD-supported experience like?’ In other words, what type of experience does the blind person undergo when using the device? And Question 2 (Q2) is: ‘to what sensory modality does the perception acquired through the coupling with an SSD belong?’ In short, does SSD perception belong to one of the existing senses, or does it constitute a new kind of sense? As an anonymous reviewer rightly pointed out, these two questions are related, but bring subtly different and rather controversial issues into play​[2]​. To answer Q1 in fact, we need to know more about phenomenology and how to tap and evaluate it​[3]​. To answer Q2, we need to know how to individuate sensory modalities​[4]​ and perhaps we need to better understand the mechanisms regulating human perception. I will leave an in depth analysis of the criteria required to distinguish the senses, of the mechanism regulating human perception, and of what count as a sense for another occasion​[5]​ and for the purpose of this paper I will rather address the two questions mentioned above together, as I believe this is the most fruitful approach for understanding SSD perception. In this spirit, I therefore advocate a strategy that aims at combining Q1 and Q2. Rather than appealing to either the phenomenology of SSD perception or to neuroscientific accounts of the cognitive mechanisms underlying SSD usage on their own, I hereby propose to complement the former with the latter, and hold them together, trying to keep the balance between them. 
Before I unfold my suggested strategy, let me however look at the literature on these two questions and briefly but firmly state the philosophical point of this paper. Block (2003) and Prinz (2006) have defended the idea that SSD perception remains in the substituting modality (auditory or tactile). Hurley and Noë (2003) instead argued that after substantial training with the device, the perceptual experience that the SSD user enjoys undergoes a change, switching from tactile/auditory to visual. This debate has unfolded in something like a stalemate where, I will argue, it has become difficult to determine whether the perception acquired through the coupling with an SSD remains in the substituting or the substituted modality. Within this puzzling deadlock two new approaches have been recently suggested. Ward and Meijer (2010) describe SSD perception as visual-like but characterize it as a kind of artificially induced synaesthesia. Auvray et al. (2007) and Auvray and Myin (2009) suggest that SSDs let their users experience a new kind of perception. Deroy and Auvray (forthcoming) refine this position, and argue that this new kind of perception depends on pre-existing senses without entirely aligning with any of them. So, they have talked about perceptual experience in SSDs as going “beyond vision”. In a similar vein, Fiona MacPherson (2011b) claims that “if the subjects (SSD users) have experiences with both vision-like and touch-like representational characteristics then perhaps they have a sense that ordinary humans do not” (MacPherson 2011b, p.139).
I use this suggestion of MacPherson’s as a motivation for exploring more fully the idea that SSD perception is something new. In this paper, in line with Auvray and Deroy, I therefore argue that SSD perception (at least in long-term, experienced users) doesn’t align with any of the pre-existing senses and that although it relies (quite heavily) on them, it nevertheless counts as something different and partially new. Unlike Auvray and Deroy however, I tentatively explain the new sensory sensitivity that these devices enable in terms of artificially induced synaesthesia. So the main goal of this paper is to synthesize and integrate the empirical work of Ward and Meijer (2010) within the conceptual framework developed by Deroy and Auvray (forthcoming), trying to cash out, in a more specific way, the details of their idea that SSD perception goes “beyond vision”. In suggesting the emergence of a new sensory modality in practised SSD users, I aim to make more explicit the false dilemma on which both Block/Prinz and Hurley/Noë rely; the shared assumption that there are only two options available to explain SSD perception (namely, that it either stays in the substituting modality, or is entirely visual). In endorsing an emergence thesis, which aims at taking us out of the dead-end of the visual vs not-visual (auditory/tactile) dilemma by refusing its two horns, I thus aim at breaking the deadlock in which the philosophical debate about sensory substitution has fallen. 
Before unfolding my argument for the idea that SSD perception in practiced users is a kind of artificially induced synaesthesia, I go back to earlier stages of the debate and briefly explore the two different positions that say that SSD perception is either auditory/tactile (Block 2003; Prinz 2006) or visual (Hurley and Noë 2003), motivating the arguments that have been presented to support these alternative claims.

Does SSD perception remain in the substituting modality?
A number of philosophers have defended the idea that SSD perceivers only use a pre-existing sense to decode some form of proximal stimulation, and that the perceptual experience obtained remains in the substituting modality (auditory/tactile). Ned Block (2003) and Jesse Prinz (2006) both accept that the SSD perceiver can enjoy experiences with spatial significance. They nevertheless deny that this spatial significance is visual in character. They both think that the SSD allows the subject to experience stuff in the wider world, but they believe that the experience the device delivers to its user remains tactile/auditory in modality. So, there are essentially two parts to their argument. One is negative: (A) SSD perception is not vision. The other is positive: (B) SSD perception is either tactile or auditory in character. I disagree with Block and Prinz on (B) but am sympathetic with (A). I disagree with them on (B) because the main reason Block and Prinz affirm B), that SSD experience is tactile or auditory, is just A), because it is not visual. So, they too quickly assume that since SSD perception is not vision, then it must remain in the substituting modality and therefore be either auditory or tactile in character. This neglects a third possibility.
In his treatment of SSDs, Block (2003) argues that findings do not provide sufficient evidence to support the idea that the perceptual experience underlying SSD usage is distinctively visual. The reports, he says, sound quite contradictory (as much spatial as visual). To corroborate his claim Block goes on to analyse a study in which Bach-y-Rita and Kercel (2003) report the experience of a tongue display unit (TDU)​[6]​ user. “The subject, they write, only describes visual means of analysis (e.g. parallax) but not visual phenomenology” and “even during task performance with the sensory system she can perceive purely tactile sensations when asked to concentrate on these sensations” (Bach-y-Rita and Kercel 2003, p.543). On the grounds of this report Block claims that when a subject perceives with a TDU, the SSD can encode spatial contents but the experience its user enjoys remains tactile. He therefore concludes that “TDU is a case of spatial perception via tactile sensation” (Block 2003, p.286). This quote is instructive, because it shows us that Block illegitimately slides from A) [SSD perception is not vision] to B) [it must be tactile/auditory] when he tacitly assumes that those spatial contents encoded via tactile sensations inevitably lead the SSD user to experience an occurrence that remains in the substituting modality. But couldn’t they lead to a new form of perceiving and experiencing? Block doesn’t say.

In a similar vein, Prinz doubts that TDU users can ever experience anything distinctively visual (Prinz 2006). He concedes that once the subjects have mastered the device, they can use the apparatus to avoid obstacles, locate items in the world or adjust their behavioural dispositions accordingly, but he remains sceptical about the possibilities of treating these responses as visual, for he claims, “there are conditions under which we can use touch to sense objects that are not in contact with our bodies” (Prinz 2006, p.4). Tapping an item with a stick enables us to locate it in the world and permits us to feel its shape and size, driving a car allows us to experience the surface of the asphalt; yet the qualities of all these experiences, cannot be said to be visual but rather remain essentially tactile (Prinz 2006). Similar considerations, Prinz continues, can be drawn for SSDs where it is hard to believe that an input (either auditory or tactile) can successfully instantiate perceptual states that are qualitatively analogous to those triggered by a visual stimulation simply by delivering analogous type of information. Again Prinz, as Block did before him, slides from A) to B) when he too hastily assumes that SSD perception must necessarily remain in the substituting modality because distal attribution does not entail a change in mode of perception to vision.

Like Block, Prinz therefore suggests that SSDs at best enable the encoding of spatial contents and that this encoding leads the impaired user to the production of high-level cognitive inferences and associations, which are then used by the subjects to perceive the distal environment. Thus, spatial encoding of contents and distal cognitive inferences are, for Block and Prinz, the best an impaired user can get out of the coupling with these devices.  While the negative component A) of Prinz and Block’s arguments seems just fine, a number of problems affect the constructive part B).

First and most important, Prinz and Block at most establish that distal attribution does not entail a change in mode of perception to vision. From this, it doesn’t however follow that SSD perception remains in the substituting modality: it could well lead the SSD user to experience an entirely new form of phenomenal access to the world. It could, for instance, result in a new form of perceiving and experiencing. Second, Prinz and Block do not offer us an account of how we make the inference from tactile sensations to distal phenomena. That is, they don’t explain the inference is by which we get it.  Further, there are important methodological issues raised by Block and Prinz’s argument. Block and Prinz only focus on the TDU and make general claims, inferences, and assumptions about SSD perception on the basis of this very specific and quite restricted category of compensatory devices. In other words, Block and Prinz base their treatment of SSDs on users of visual-to-tactile substitution devices and don’t tackle the case of users of visual-to-auditory systems at all. They nevertheless believe that the considerations that apply to visual-to-tactile substitution devices generalize to visual-to-auditory substitution systems. But is this belief well-grounded?  I believe it is not. One cannot make general claims on narrow empirical grounds. Block and Prinz may have thought that the reports coming from TDU users were all taken from long-term (proficient) perceivers. But this wasn’t clearly the case. Until perhaps 7-8 years ago in fact few users of the TDU had been trained for more than 6-8 hours, and 6-8 hours isn’t certainly a sufficient period for someone to become an expert perceiver​[7]​. So, lack of training might affect the credibility of the reports that Block and Prinz mention. Furthermore, if Block and Prinz had analysed other types of systems (such as visual-to-auditory substitution features) they would have found other reports and realized (as we will see in the next section) that training has a direct impact on the capacity to interpret the stimuli, and therefore bears on the ability to perceive with the device. In other words, if Block and Prinz had looked at a wider range of cases, reports, and devices they would have noticed the incompleteness of their positive proposal (B): the idea that SSD perception is tactile or auditory in character. 

The points Block and Prinz make against the idea that SSD users can experience full-blown visual occurrences are consistent and reasonable, and the negative part of their argument (A) is well-grounded. But the conclusion (B) they draw from it is highly problematic for the three reasons I have given above. Given those concerns, I therefore think we should look for an alternative account. In pursuit of such an alternative I next consider, and reject, a view (endorsed by Susan Hurley and Alva Noë) that invites us to think that SSD perception might be vision-like after all. 

                                               Is SSD perception rather vision? 

Susan Hurley and Alva Noë (2003) argue that, after substantial training and adaptation, the perceptual phenomenology obtained through coupling with a TDU switches from tactile to visual. Contra Block and Prinz, they claim that the similarities between TDU perception and natural vision go far beyond mere localisation or spatial encoding of information and rather extend “to the distinctively visual way in which dynamic sensorimotor interactions with the environment provide information to the TDU perceiver” (Hurley and Noë 2003, p.145). But in what way does TDU perception after adaptation resemble natural vision, and in which structural respects is TDU perception more like vision than touch or audition? Hurley and Noë claim that after successful adaptation the practised TDU user undergoes an intermodal change in her experience (from tactile to visual). To corroborate this claim Hurley and Noë try to show two things: 1) that the subject, while using the device, experiences a visual form of perception or something that resembles vision very closely and 2) that this experience becomes visual in character because of the user’s commitment to learn and connect the inputs she experiences with the motor responses that are characteristic of vision. Let me address these two points separately.

Point 1. Alleged similarities between natural vision and TDU perception
Hurley and Noë notice that there are some similarities between natural vision and TDU perception. First, expert TDU users consistently attest to the emergence of visual effects or of visual illusions after wearing the device. These effects and illusions typically include “parallax, perspective, looming, zooming and depth effects, and the waterfall illusion” (Hurley and Noë 2003, p.145; see also Bach-y-Rita and Kercel 2003). Second, Hurley and Noë claim that both natural vision and TDU perception are governed and directed by analogous laws of occlusion. “You see, or TDU-perceive, objects around you only if they are not blocked from view by other opaque objects” (Hurley and Noë 2003, p.144). So, on their account, TDU perception is linked to natural vision in manners that are not exclusively captured by its spatial significance. These alleged similarities (though fascinating), aren’t however yet sufficient to demonstrate that TDU experience becomes, after training, distinctively visual. In order to establish this much Hurley and Noë need to show something more. They need to show the role that motor responses play in converting tactile sensations into something that is qualitatively like vision. 

Point 2. Inputs and Motor responses: the experience becomes distinctively visual
The distinctively visual character of TDU perception, Hurley and Noë thus argue, “stems from the way perceivers can acquire and use practical knowledge of the common laws of sensorimotor contingency that vision and TDU perception share” (Hurley and Noë  2003, p.145).  One of the essential components of their account is therefore the concept of qualitative adaptation, which depends on processes of sensorimotor integration and is carried out via a motor element. O’Regan and Noë (2001) conjectured that proficient users of the TDU are able to individuate and pick up on different patterns of contingencies that hold between the movements they make and what they are able to perceive. O’Regan and Noë (2001) have called these patterns of dependencies “the sensorimotor dynamics” and have argued that these patterns govern TDU perception. To explain the role of these patterns in TDU perception, Hurley and Noë (2003) invite us to imagine a situation in which the perceiver has to move around a given object. As the perceiver moves around the object, different portions of it become available to the camera and are automatically mapped into tactile sensations. When the perceiver approaches the object, the image related to the mapping expands, as if she were seeing properly. Conversely, when she moves away from the object the size of the related image shrinks. “Subjects, they argue, cannot become attuned to these sensorimotor dynamics if they are not in control of the device” (Kiverstein 2007, p.130). On these grounds, Hurley and Noë go on to claim that:  “what it is like to see is similar to what it is like to perceive by TDU because seeing and TDU-perception are similar ways of exploring the environment” (Hurley and Noë 2003, p.145).  
So the nature of SSD perception, on their account, depends on the amount and quality of sensorimotor contingencies that this acquired perception shares with natural vision and on the nature, intensity and duration of the coupling with the device. The more the user is trained with the device, the more she masters it. The more the subject masters the device, the more invariants her acquired perception shares with vision. The more invariants the acquired perception shares with natural vision the more it resembles it. The importance of mastering the device to acquire the sensorimotor dependencies necessary to trigger visual skills and to develop visual-like spatial abilities is also confirmed by some reports. “Very soon after I had learned how to scan, the sensations no longer felt as if they were on my back, and I became less and less aware that vibrating pins were making contact with my skin” (Guarniero 1974, p. 104; quoted in Deroy and Auvray forthcoming, § 2). 

But does the Hurley and Noë sensorimotor theory really hold up? And do the arguments offered and the reports presented suffice unequivocally to establish the claim that SSD perception is visual? A number of considerations might be used to challenge their understanding of SSD usage. SSDs, for instance, do not provide their users with colours; neither endow them with the capacity of smooth tracking objects, or the ability to fully perceive depth. Sure there can still be vision without colours, but it seems extremely difficult to experience characteristically visual sensations without the possibility of discriminating depth properly or without the ability to smoothly track even slow moving objects​[8]​. For all these reasons, current visual-to-tactile and visual-to-auditory substitution devices seem to be a long way from the goal of achieving a real sense of vision. As Kevin O’Regan has recently noticed “using tactile or auditory stimulation, it is possible only to provide a few aspects of normal visual impressions, like the quality of being out there in the world, and of conveying information about spatial layout and object form. But the image-like quality of vision still seems far away” (O’Regan 2011, p.142-143).

If however neither of the understandings proposed so far appropriately capture the nature of the experience that accompanies SSD perception, then how do we characterise it? In what remains of this paper I argue, in line with more recent empirical findings, that the continuous coupling with SSDs leads the expert user to experience a quality of perception that is neither visual nor auditory/tactile in a straightforward way. Crucially this kind of perception possesses both visual and tactile/auditory components and can therefore be said to be both seen and heard/felt. If however this particular mode of access to the world is neither entirely tactile/auditory nor exclusively visual, what exactly is it? In the next section I offer my own view of the form that this perceptual experience eventually takes.  
Neither Touch nor Vision but something different: Beyond Vision or Artificial Synaesthesia?

In a recent study Malika Auvray and colleagues gathered a group of six normal sighted subjects (with age ranging from 23 to 32 years). They blindfolded and trained them with the vOICe for approximately fifteen hours​[9]​ (Auvray et al. 2007). The participants in this study were not familiar with the device and after a short training session of three hours, they underwent a series of experiments involving localization, recognition, and discrimination tasks. In the localization task the experimenters assessed the participants' ability to individuate and to point at a target when using a constrained pointing task. In the recognition task Auvray and colleagues examined whether participants could recognise items in the world via their auditory rendering. In the discrimination task the experimenters finally considered whether participants, who recognized different items, could also discriminate among different versions of the same object (Auvray et al. 2007). After these experiments took place, the subjects were given questionnaires (in French) and solicited to report their qualitative apprehension of the use of the device both for localization and for recognition/discrimination tasks. In particular, the participants were asked the following question: “to which sensory modality would you compare your experience?” (Auvray et al. 2007, p.430).




So for five out of six over-trained participants the perception with the SSD wasn’t neither visual nor auditory in a straightforward way. Testimonies, in particular, indicated that localization tasks were more likely to be apprehended either as giving rise to visual experiences or as belonging to a new sense. [see table above]. Most of the subjects however provided alternative descriptions of their qualitative experience when they were asked to describe what it felt like for recognition and discrimination tasks. “One of the participants, in particular reported, that his experience was felt as visual when he was locating an object in space and as auditory when he was recognizing the shape of the object” (Deroy and Auvray forthcoming, § 5). In sum, while subjects could develop visual-like abilities in localisation tasks, the very same people had difficulties in experiencing full-blown visual awareness in recognition and discrimination tasks.  As a consequence, the conveyed qualitative experience was not automatically associated with either audition or vision but its task-dependent nature was very much emphasized. These results (despite the admittedly restricted sample of individuals) seem to confirm the fact that in relatively vOICe users the perceptual occurrence neither completely aligns with hearing/touch, nor fully coincides with vision. An option that these findings leave open is therefore to interpret perception with the device as floating between different sensory modalities in accordance to the task given and the tool used. Another option is to understand these results as offering evidence for a frequent but distinct switch between hearing/touch and vision. 

On the grounds of the empirical findings mentioned in the previous paragraph, Deroy and Auvray (forthcoming) have recently proposed explaining the perceptual experience that accompanies SSD usage as going ‘beyond vision’. They claim that even though SSD perception can at times be reminiscent of either touch/audition or vision, it is nevertheless profoundly different from both of them. SSD usage, for Deroy and Auvray, provides a novel mode of experience to its user, and the best way to capture this novelty is to think about the use of an SSD as being something closer to the development of a new set of automatic recognition abilities, emerging from other sensory modalities and other pre-existing capacities (Deroy and Auvray forthcoming, §6). Deroy and Auvray thus defend an emergence thesis, which aims at taking us out of the dead-end of the visual vs not-visual (auditory/tactile) dilemma, by refusing its two horns. Unfortunately, they have not yet cashed out the details of their hypothesis: this is what I try to do in what remains of this paper. 

If the phenomenology of SSD perception (in relatively well-experienced users) doesn’t stay in one modality but exploits the pre-existing senses to give the impaired users a different kind of perception, couldn’t we speculate that SSD perception, in giving them something new, blends vision with hearing or touch? Before I try to corroborate this claim, let me note that this idea is indeed, at present, a speculation. It could well be, as noted above, that there is a frequent switch between hearing/touch and vision instead. However, even if there is such a frequent switch in accordance to the task given (localization, recognition, or discrimination), it seems plausible to interpret the final percept experienced by the SSD user as a combination of the several switches that take place in different tasks, and therefore it seems legitimate to say that this percept blends vision with hearing/touch. So these findings, however understood (either as providing evidence for switches or floating between modalities), tell us that SSD perception, in practised vOICe users at least, is different both from hearing/touch and vision but nevertheless intrinsically possesses both of these components. Given this interesting suggestion, couldn’t we then just say that SSD perception becomes a kind of artificially induced synaesthesia? 

Synaesthesia in a nutshell
Synaesthesia is a neurologically-based condition in which stimulation of one sensory or cognitive pathway leads to involuntary (Rich and Mattingley 2002), and unintentional occurrences in a second sensory or cognitive pathway (Cytowic 2003). In synaesthesia,“sensory experiences, such as tastes, or concepts, such as numbers, automatically evoke additional percepts, such as colours” (Cohen Kadosh and Walsh 2006, R963).  For example, a vision–touch synaesthete can experience the feeling of being touched when seeing other humans being touched as well as a grapheme–colour synaesthete can experience colour when reading a digit or a letter. For this reason, synaesthesia is often described as a merging of the senses, a cross-modal union of different sensory modalities or of different features within the same sensory modality (i.e., colors and digits within vision). Researchers have tried to classify synaesthetic experiences into different categories. Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001) in particular distinguish grapheme-colour synaesthetes between lower and higher synaesthetes. The former, they argue, are sensitive to the basic sensory features of the inducer whereas the latter are responsive to the kind of object they recognize. Dixon et al. (2004) endorse another type of categorisation and propose to divide synaesthetes between “associators”, those who perceive the atypical color in an internal space (in the “mind's eye”, as they report), and “projectors”, those who experience it in the external world, (for instance overlaying the letter on the page). In the attempt to provide a unitary framework within which to describe synaesthesia, researchers have also individuated a number of diagnostic criteria that characterize this phenomenon. Neuroscientists Richard Cytowic and David Eagleman (2009) in particular have individuated five crucial components underlying any synaesthetic experience. Synaesthesia, they argue, is 1) involuntary; 2) extremely memorable; 3) laden with affect​[10]​; 4) consistent​[11]​; and 5) spatially extended​[12]​. Synaesthesia is thus a condition that accompanies the individual during her lifetime. 
Synaesthesia, Sensory Substitution, and the Neuroscience behind them
Having described synaesthesia as a cross-modal union of different sensory modalities (or of different features within the same sensory modality), and speculated that SSD perception might turn out to be a kind of artificially induced synaesthesia, I now turn to some empirical findings in neuroscience that seem to provide grounds for this speculation. Let me start with the idea of cross-modal plasticity. I will show first that both synaesthesia and SSD perception are profoundly cross-modal. Then I will go on to further highlight other analogies.
In the field of sensory substitution, neuroscientific evidence suggests that SSD users experience cross-modal occurrences and multisensory integration after immersive training with these devices. In a recent study, Amedi and co-workers (2007) take for granted that the lateral-occipital-temporal cortex (LOtv) is primarily involved in the integration of visual and tactile information about objects (in general, i.e. normal touch or vision) and then show that the LOtv is also activated when using the vOICe (Amedi et al. 2007). Analogously, Ptito and Kupers (2005) suggest that patients’ tongues come to act “as portals to convey somatosensory information to visual cortex” (Ptito and Kupers 2005, p. 606). More recently, Ortiz et al. (2011) report the recruitment of the occipital cortex during training with SSDs and the emergence of ‘visual qualia’, the subjective sensation of seeing flashes of light congruent with tactile stimuli, in trained blind subjects. So, all these studies demonstrate the recruitment of the occipital cortex in early blind subjects during the processing of tactile encoded visual information and reveal that SSDs can exploit cross-modal plasticity to get integrated into the user’s perceptual repertoire. These findings thus demonstrate that SSD perception is deeply and profoundly cross-modal. But there is more.
Kupers and colleagues (2011) favour an account of cross-modal plasticity in SSD users that involves disinhibition of existing pathways over a view that prescribes cortical reorganisation. A number of other neuroscientists working on synaesthesia have proposed a similar understanding to comprehend and describe the neurocognitive mechanisms that characterise this phenomenon. In particular, they have suggested that synaesthesia is a cross-modal occurrence due to disinhibition (Grossenbacher and Lovelace 2001) or unmasking (Cohen Kadosh and Walsh 2006; Cohen Kadosh and Henik 2007) between or within brain areas. 
Now, if cross-modal plasticity and multisensory integration in SSD users are explained in terms of disinhibition, and this form of disinhibition or unmasking also characterises the phenomenon of synaesthesia, couldn’t we propose that the same thing happens in SSD users? The new type of perception that SSD users enjoy through cross-modal plasticity would just be a variety of synaesthesia, namely artificially induced synaesthesia.  While there is no empirical evidence, at the time of writing at least, to support this idea, there isn’t any either that goes against it. So we can take this suggestion as a fascinating speculation that deserves further empirical corroboration. A good way to evaluate this speculation might be to look at a number of reports from well-trained SSD users. If we do so, we see that these reports attest to the emergence of synaesthetic experiences after prolonged usage of an SSD. In an interesting study conducted on two late blind long-term vOICe users who are also Dr. Meijer’s long term collaborators ​[13]​, Ward and Meijer (2010) found that the experience of the two subjects were analogous to a form of: 
“Monochrome artificially induced synaesthesia only in certain frequencies of sound… It is almost as if you had a computer with two monitors running simultaneously different pictures, one was a very grey blurred version of the real world, and the other was a pure grey background with a big semi-circular light grey arc on it, and sometimes you switched your attention between both” (Ward and Meijer 2010, p.497-498).

One of the two users (PF) also claims that the sounds generated by the device elicited visual occurrences, causing her to progressively experience colors (Ward and Meijer 2010, p.497). Interestingly, both subjects claimed, after extensive training and practise with the device, to ‘see sounds’ even when not wearing the vOICe. So, it looks like their brain has learned or internalized the vOICe rules for mapping and re-deploys them both when the device is worn and when it is not (Ward and Meijer 2010). Another interesting thing that emerged from these reports is that one of the users (PF) also affirmed that her “synaesthetic experiences” to the soundscapes produced by the vOICe were stable and consistent over time.
 “.... I thought my mood, time, environment factors, etc., would change the images, color, motion effects. It does not” [email from PF, 26th March 2008, quoted in (Ward and Meijer 2010, p.498)].
This is a crucial point because it highlights the stability of the experience during lifetime. Stability or consistency, as we have seen in the previous subsection, is (for many theorists at least) a hallmark trait of developmental synaesthesia and the fact that we found it in the reports seem to redound in favour of the idea that SSD perception might resemble a form of artificially induced synaesthesia after all.  
But what about the other four definitional aspects of synaesthesia we discussed in the previous sub-section? Is SSD perception in long term users spatially extended? In SSD perception sounds or vibrotactile stimulations are generally "spatialized". Despite being heard or felt, the SSD user always perceives these sounds as coming from a very specific location in the world. Experienced SSD users can usually make correct verbal and graphical descriptions of unfamiliar environments (i.e. a room) or of the position of objects and surface they encounter on it (Rodríguez-hernández et al. 2010).  In other words, quite often many objects’ spatial properties (such as shape, width and location) can be experienced by the blind perceivers through hearing or touch and then “spatialized” (located in the world) when the users are asked to report about their position. So yes, SSD perception seems to be spatially extended. SSD perception is also highly memorable. In fact it is memorable because it is extremely learnable. As we have seen before, via training the vOICe users learn how to interpret the stimulation coming from the device and their brain gradually internalises or memorises the vOICe rules for mapping, redeploying them even when the subjects are not wearing the device. But SSD perception is also involuntary. After extensive practice, the device gets increasingly transparent, its boundaries progressively fade away, and the perception experienced through the coupling with it becomes involuntary. SSD perception isn’t however (normally) laden with affect. In truth, as noted before, not all forms of synaesthesia are laden with affect and so this particular definitional aspect doesn’t seem to be necessary for the emergence of synaesthetic experiences. Nor does the fact that SSD perception isn’t laden with affect preclude the corroboration of my argument.  
Before I wrap up with some concluding remarks, I would like to briefly return to the balancing strategy (between neuro-scientific accounts and phenomenological reports) I advocated at the beginning of this paper to analyze its efficacy. I think the integrationist take I have embraced has been successful. If I were to concentrate on either mechanisms or phenomenology separately, I probably wouldn’t have discovered the link between synaesthesia and SSD perception; a link that indeed proved to be most intriguing and fascinating. So with regard to this point the balancing strategy I adopted has paid off.
But what have we learned from our brief analysis of the similarities between SSD perception and standard forms of synaesthesia as revealed through the lens of this integrationist take? Well, the considerations of the previous paragraphs suggest that, prima facie at least, it might be reasonable to say that SSD perception could resemble a novel form of perception, namely a kind of acquired (artificially induced) synaesthesia. This claim seems plausible, for at least four important reasons. First, the experienced users of an SSD undergo a form of perceiving that fulfils many of the key properties that characterise standard synaesthetic experiences. Second, there is a strong analogy at the level of neuro-cognitive mechanisms of activation (essentially the idea of disinhibition), between developmental forms of synaesthesia and SSD perception. Third, both SSD perception and developmental forms of synaesthesia are deeply and profoundly cross-modal. Fourth, we possess a number of subjective reports (from experienced SSD users) that corroborate (empirically) the analogy I presented above. However, the level of generality and the credibility of the reports that provide empirical grounds for that analogy is at stake. What kinds of generalisation can we make based on two single reports, and what credibility do these reports achieve? Sadly, no hard evidence (apart from those two reports) has been produced so far to confirm the idea that the perception acquired through coupling with the SSD is a kind of artificially induced synaesthesia and unfortunately we just don't have those many proficient blind users yet to test this hypothesis empirically and make a statistical argument on a larger scale, say 80%+ of the users. So, the pillars of the analogy I have drawn admittedly rest on (statistically) weak empirical grounds and, no doubt, there is still lots more work to be done in order to confirm my claim empirically. How could my claim be better corroborated? As Peter Meijer (in private correspondence) has noticed: ‘in order to better evaluate this proposal we may indeed need to resort to third-person statistics of first-person accounts of subjective experiences’, or we might look for differences in brain activation between SSD users who report e.g. seeing colours (in response to soundscapes) and those who don't. It might turn out that the former show a pattern of brain activation more closely resembling that of developmental synaesthetes.
In this paper, awaiting such stronger empirical evidence, I nevertheless hope to have demonstrated (theoretically at least) that SSD perception, in relatively well-experienced users, is neither tactile nor visual (in a straightforward way) and that it rather counts as something different, quite possibly new, regardless of the precise way we cash out the details of the novel sensory sensitivity that these devices seem to enable. 
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^1	  Department of Cognitive Science, ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders, Australian Hearing Hub, 16 University Avenue, Macquarie University, North Ryde, 2109, Sydney (NSW), Australia. Email: farinamirko@gmail.com. Tel. : +61 2 9850 4436. Fax: +61 2 9850 6059 
^2	  Thanks also to John Sutton for clarifying these issues.
^3	  So, we probably need a substantial amount of reports in order to make a strong statistical argument based on them.
^4	  The question of how to individuate the senses has a long history. H. P. Grice (1962) discussed four criteria (the proper objection criterion, the character of experience criterion, the physical features criterion, and the sensory organ criterion) that one might use to distinguish the senses and argued that there is an ineliminable role for the phenomenal character of experiences in individuating them. More recently, Nudds (2004) has argued that sense is an intuitive concept that we employ for certain everyday purposes. In particular, he suggests that the concept of sense relies on societal agreement and ‘convention’. Nudds thus embraces a folk-psychological understanding of the senses. Keeley (2002) has defended a neurobiological criterion for counting the senses, according to which token perceptions count as instances of different sense modalities because of the “character of the putative sense organs and their modes of connection with the brain” (2002: 13). Instead of differentiating the senses just on the basis of whether experience begins in the eyes, ears, nose, tongue or skin, Keeley argues we must also take into account whether the sense organ is, as he puts it, ‘appropriately wired up’ (Keeley 2009). So Keeley defends a scientific account of the senses. The question of how to individuate the senses has taken on fresh interest (Macpherson 2011a) and a series of philosophers have recently proposed other views to specify what counts as a sense and how to individuate sensory modalities. See in particular O’Callaghan (2012); Matthen (forthcoming); and Stokes, Biggs, & Matthen, (forthcoming).
^5	  In Kiverstein, Farina, and Clark (forthcoming), we address the debate on human sensory modalities and its link with sensory substitution, and offer a critical analysis of Keeley’s notion of dedication with respect to SSDs.
^6	  TDU or Tongue Display Unit is a sensory substitution device that belongs to the category of visual-to-tactile substitution features. The FSRS discussed above and the Brain Port are probably the most successful example of a TDU. 
^7	  Anders Ericsson (1993) claims that it takes 10,000 hours [20 hours for 50 weeks a year for ten years] of deliberate practice to become an expert in any particular activity. I do not wish to evaluate this controversial assumption, but rather use it to emphasise the role of experience in the development of skills and expertise. 
^8	 For an in-depth analysis of the limitations of perceptual and cognitive processing associated with current sensory substitution devices see [Loomis (2010): Loomis et al. (in press)].
^9	  15 hours of training are most probably not enough to turn a naïve subject into an expert user (see note 5 above). But 15 hours of training are better than just 6-8 hours (the standard amount of practice to which many TDU users were normally exposed in the past). So, even if the labels “expert users” or “over-trained participants” are not, by Ericsson’s standards, appropriate to define the subjects involved in this experiment; their usage appears legitimate when we compared these subjects to standard TDU users, who were tested after a much reduced period of training.
^10	  Not all forms of synaesthesia are laden with affect. So, this definitional aspect doesn’t seem to be strictly necessary.
^11	 Perhaps the most discussed of all these definitional aspects is the consistency criterion. Consistency or persistency over time is the idea that the same inducer always triggers the same concurrent type of synaesthetic experience. See Auvray and Deroy (forthcoming). For some criticism of the idea that consistency can be used as a gold-standard criterion for establishing the authenticity of an individual’s synesthesia see Simner (2012) instead.
^12	 Is the synesthetic occurrence experienced internally or rather perceived as having a spatial connotation? This is a much debated issue in the literature. Saying that synaesthesia is spatially extended might indeed depend on the projector/associator divide. It is important to note however that some authors, such as Simner (2012) and Rich & Mattingley (forthcoming) reject this divide and instead claim that there is a continuum between projectors and associators.
^13	  PF became blind at the age of 21 after an accident. She first used The vOICe in 1998. CC was born with rod dystrophy. She had very bad eyesight as a child and as a teenager but was registered blind only at the age of 33. She first used The vOICe in 2001.
